Dishonest and Hypocritical: Museveni on Sudan

0
93

 

Introduction

For the last 17 years, parts of northern Uganda, predominantly those inhabited by the Acholi ethnic community within Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader districts, have been caught up in a devastating rebellion fought between the so-called Lords Resistance Army (LRA) – led by former Catholic catechist Joseph Kony – and the Museveni government and the Ugandan army (the Ugandan People’s Defence Force or UPDF). The extent of this unrest can be measured by the fact that up to 800,000 people have been displaced by rebel activity or forcibly relocated by the Ugandan army. Gulu hosts the bulk of these internally displaced persons (IDPs), estimated at about 400,000, and in Kitgum camps have spontaneously emerged to accommodate some 100,000 IDPs.(1)

Having made considerable headway in restoring and enhancing its diplomatic relations with the rest of the world, Sudan has for several years also been eager to normalise its relationship with Uganda.(2) It is a matter of record that the Museveni regime has long supported the Sudanese rebel movement, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), both politically and militarily. The military assistance over the years has been considerable, ranging from logistically assisting with the movement of SPLA mechanised regiments into Sudan in 1989, the provision of rear- bases and weapons through to the use of Ugandan air force helicopters in support of SPLA operations. Direct Ugandan military involvement has also included the deployment of brigade sized UPDF units inside Sudan.(3) After years of denying such military assistance, testimony before the Ugandan parliament itself revealed the close relationship between the Ugandan army and the SPLA, including direct supplies of weapons.(4) As a response to this, Sudan had lent some assistance to the LRA. In its endeavours to restore its relations with Uganda, in 2001 Sudan cut whatever links it had with the LRA and signed an agreement in March 2002 which, in an unprecedented act of faith, allowed the Ugandan military to enter Sudanese sovereign territory and attack the Ugandan rebels.(5) This was to be in return for the SPLA not being allowed to operate in and from, or to be assisted by, Uganda.

The Ugandan military operation was to be called “Operation Iron Fist”, and was aimed at LRA bases in the huge, lawless expanses of southern Sudan. The operation included allowing the UPDF to build security roads in southern Sudan.(6) The Ugandan government initially said they only needed until April 2002 to destroy the rebels.(7) This was then extended for a month at Kampala’s request.(8) In July it was then extended once again.(9) In November 2002, the Sudanese government agreed to a further extension.(10) And in February, Khartoum agreed to yet another extension until May 2002.(11) The Sudanese have also paid a heavy price for its cooperation with Uganda. Many Sudanese soldiers were killed in anti-LRA operations, and hundreds of Sudanese civilians also subsequently died in rebel attacks on their villages.(12)

Museveni Loses Face in Uganda and Internationally

It was claimed that Operation Iron Fist would finish the LRA once and for all. As early as March 2002, the Ugandan army claimed to have defeated the LRA.(13) In July the army stated that rebel activity had dropped to almost zero.(14) It was also claimed by the Ugandan army that they had contained the rebellion in northern Uganda.(15) In August 2002, yet again Museveni publicly “donned military fatigues” and announced he was personally supervising the destruction of the LRA.(16) The Ugandan Defence Minister declared that “we have cornered Kony”.(17) Major- General James Kazini, the Ugandan military commander publicly stated in May 2002: “You call me on December 31; if Kony is still alive I will resign.”(18) Yet, despite having cost a quarter of a billion dollars – two and a half times Uganda’s annual military budget – it soon became clear that Museveni’s Operation Iron Fist had not destroyed the LRA.(19) ‘Africa Confidential’ noted that the UPDF’s failure in Sudan was “costly” and that the Ugandan army had sustained hundreds of casualties.(20) ‘Africa Confidential’ stated: “these failures should be blamed on the ruling military triumvirate: UPDF Commander General James Kazini; sometime UPDF Commander in northern Uganda, Lieutenant Gen. Salim Saleh; and President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni himself. The apex shows little sign of contrition.”(21) Instead they blamed Sudan. Having publicly failed – as the result of military incompetence and ill- founded arrogance – to crush the LRA, Museveni then claimed that this failure was because Sudan had continued to assist the Lords Resistance Army. Khartoum has angrily denied these assertions stating that “it is mere propaganda by those with an interest in derailing the peace process between the two governments. When we took action to fight the LRA alongside Uganda, it was a clear and strong commitment.”(22) It is a matter of record that Sudan has done everything asked of it by the Ugandan regime, up to and including deploying Sudanese forces in anti- LRA operations.(23)

The simple fact is that the Ugandan army’s performance was dismal. Indeed, there were subsequent reports that in many cases the Ugandan army simply dropped its weapons and fled the battle.(24) It is also well known that there is major, systemic corruption within the army and defence ministry, with, amongst other things, thousands of “ghost” soldiers being carried on divisional payrolls.(25) This may also have effected the efficiency and demoralisation of the Ugandan army.

Museveni has been stung by unprecedented criticism in the Ugandan parliament that the army was doing nothing to end the insurgency in northern Uganda.(26) The Uganda parliament publicly demonstrated its lack of little faith in the Ugandan military in its request that the government engage South African mercenaries in the conflict against the LRA. This deeply embarrassed Museveni, who stated – quite correctly – that it showed “a lack of confidence in our own army”.(27) Ugandan radio station talk shows have also been inundated with criticism of Museveni and the army.(28)

Museveni’s operations were militarily inept, not having foreseen that guerrillas, when attacked, will fragment and regroup or refocus elsewhere. This is precisely what the LRA forces did.

There had been scepticism from the very outset about the ability of Operation Iron Fist to defeat the LRA. The British human rights group African Rights noted that: “The most widely held view among the Acholi is that the current military operation should not have taken place at all. From their point of view, a crucial but delicate and complicated exercise has been needlessly jeopardised in the search for a short-term solution, which now risks deepening and prolonging the conflict.”(29) This is precisely what happened: the Ugandan rebels withdrew back into northern Uganda and opened up new fronts in eastern Uganda. This was something which any military strategist should have foreseen. It was also something apparently unseen by Museveni.

Museveni’s Excuses Fall Short

Museveni has also repeatedly justified his government’s colossal military budget by pointing to events in the north of Uganda, increasing the budget by 20 percent in 1995. Ugandan defence spending in 1996 rose by a further 36 percent. It has grown since. Despite this, Museveni blamed his army’s inability to defeat or even contain the LRA, on military under-resourcing. In the wake of the Operation Iron Fist fiasco he declared: “The country’s insecurity has been lingering on because of underspending on defence, which is a big mistake that will not be repeated.” He claimed that he was unable to defeat the insurgents “because we do not have good military equipment.”(30) Ugandan parliamentarians were critical of this claim, arguing that the problems “are not military but political”. That his excuses are flimsy is illustrated by the fact that the size of the Ugandan army is at an all- time high at 52,000 men, organised into 18 battalions.(31) Ugandan politicians such as Beti Kamya Turwomwe have challenged whether any further military spending would defeat the rebellion: “The conflict is not a question of money…It is not a question of military might or funding…We need to go back to the drawing board and understand the dynamics of this war. We have gained nothing by hiding dirt under the carpet. Otherwise we will be like the ostrich with its head in the sand.”(32)

The Real Reason for Failure

The important Ugandan newspaper, ‘New Vision’, addressed the real reasons for Museveni’s inability to end the rebellion in northern Uganda. In an analysis entitled “Why Army Has Failed to Uproot Kony Rebellion”, the newspaper stated that the LRA has a “supportive population”.(33) Ugandans themselves have grown tired of Museveni’s facile excuses – the 1,106 word article did not once mention Sudan as a reason for the rebellion’s continued existence. Another key Ugandan newspaper, ‘The Monitor’, has also challenged Museveni’s facile attempts to divert blame for his own mistakes. In an editorial, the newspaper noted that the most important question with regard to the northern insurgency was “the political question – democracy and political consensus at a wider national level.”(34) The newspaper also pointed to serious levels of corruption within the government and military. This editorial also conspicuously failed to mention Sudan. In its analysis of the conflict in northern Uganda, the Kenyan newspaper, ‘The East African’, also documented how the war is spiralling out of control. It also did not mention Sudan.(35)

Museveni is Blocking Peace

Many Ugandans believe that the war in northern Uganda continues because Museveni wants it to continue. It has, for example, been reported that “on local FM stations, some talk-show panellists and callers” have suggested that “Museveni is deliberately provoking the conflict because it benefits his political career in some inexplicable way.”(36) Observers have certainly noted that the attitude of the Ugandan military is an obstacle to negotiating peace in northern Uganda. Bishop Ochola, chairman of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI), accused the military of sabotaging peace arrangements.(37) Carlos Rodriguez, a Catholic missionary in Gulu and member of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, criticised the government’s military methods against the LRA which, he argues, have led to the deaths of innocent civilians and the abduction of children.

“The army tells us that they have killed rebels. But when you look at the so-called rebels, most of them are women and children. We don’t think the solution is to kill the same people whom we have failed to protect from the rebels in the first place…You don’t use helicopter gunships to kill guerrillas. You end up killing many innocent people.”(38)

In a 35-page report, entitled “Seventy Times Seven”, published in May 2002, the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative stated that “the heavy UPDF deployment in Sudan and its all-out offensive against the LRA seems to have silenced anybody advocating dialogue and reconciliation, and given way to other voices.”(39)

A delegation from Refugees International reported that “the widely held sentiment by people in northern Uganda is that the government is not committed to peace”. They noted, for example, that “on one occasion when religious leaders tried to meet with the LRA, they were ambushed by the Ugandan military and accused of being rebel collaborators. The Ugandan government, while publicly stating that it will negotiate, has shown little real commitment to a peaceful solution and critics have gone so far as to accuse it of sabotaging peace efforts.”(40) The Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda, a coalition of 40 non- governmental organisations working with civilians affected by the conflict has said that any peace process should be “inclusive, based on patient dialogue and on the search for consensus on underlying issues, not fixed positions.”(41) African Rights has also echoed the need for consensus: “Disregard for the views of local people is a major reason for the problems that have beset this [peace] initiative from the outset.(42)

Museveni has himself dismissed rebel attempts to initiate ceasefires.(43) His response to a March 2003 LRA ceasefire call was to state “there is no ceasefire”.(44) He was heavily criticised by northern parliamentarians who called on the government to think twice about this as “we feel the rebels are serious”.

Origins of the Conflict in Northern Uganda

Blaming the insurgency on Sudan also helps to mask the ethnic dimension of the war, as outlined in an article in ‘The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution’: “According to Museveni… the initial issue or reason for the conflict was that the Acholi community was deprived of their ability to get rich off the looting of all other Ugandans.”(45) The article quoted Museveni as saying: “It was purely tribal opportunism that brought such numbers (50,000) to their side. In other words the reason why those rebels in the north, organized on a tribal basis, were fighting for control of the national government was that the NRM as a government had stopped them from looting.”(46)

‘The Economist’ argues that Museveni has clear interests in there being no political parties: “were party politics permitted in Uganda and were they to go ‘tribal’ – as well they might – Mr Museveni would probably lose power, since he comes from a small group”.(47) It is a matter of record that Museveni has heavily favoured his own tribe and region in political, and particularly military appointments. ‘The Financial Times’ observed: “Power has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of the president and a group of aides, officials, ministers and army officers drawn from Mr Museveni’s home region in the west.”(48) ‘New African’ magazine reported that the only officers holding the rank of Major-General and above in Rwanda are from Museveni’s own tribe.(49)

This ethnic imbalance in large part also explains why there is also armed conflict in western, south-western and eastern Uganda. Western Uganda is subject to an uprising led by rebels of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).(50) Groups such as the Ugandan People’s Redemption Army and the Uganda People’s Defence Forces are also active.(51) An assessment of unrest in western Uganda published by the London-based human rights group African Rights stated that there was “an undercurrent of dissatisfaction” amongst the region’s population, who felt vulnerable and neglected. There was also said to be local political and ethnic tensions and “a sense of desperation” which created fertile ground for the insurgency.(52) The report stated that there was a perceived “democracy deficit within Ugandan politics” and the conditions for armed rebellion could not be ruled out in the future.(53) Museveni naturally attributes any unrest in western Sudan to Sudan and the Congo. Seven thousand Ugandan soldiers were deployed in eastern Uganda because of ethnic conflict amongst the Karamojong people.(54) There are several other rebel groups operating in Uganda. These include the West Nile Bank Front, Uganda Rescue Front II, led by Brigadier Ali Bamuze, the Uganda Salvation Front/Army, Uganda National Democratic Alliance, the Citizens Army for Multiparty Politics, as well as FUNA-Uganda National Army.(55)

Rather than accept that it is his divisive ethnicist and repressive policies that have provoked armed unrest throughout his country, Museveni has blamed everyone except himself. He has blamed Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda for being behind these insurgencies. Rwanda, having squabbled with Museveni over the theft of natural resources in the Congo, has now ritualistically also been accused of assisting the LRA.(56)

It is Time to Reassess Museveni

Since Yoweri Museveni came to power in 1986, apologists for Museveni have pointed to Uganda’s stability after many years of conflict, high economic growth rates and the stemming of the upward trend of HIV/AIDS infection rates in the country. The reality is that his autocratic, repressive and ethnicist policies have provoked, deepened and escalated armed unrest throughout Uganda. In addition to the untold suffering he has caused to the Ugandan people, the United Nations has clearly spelt out the results of Museveni’s policies in the Congo:

“For the more than 20 million people living in the five eastern provinces, the number of excess deaths directly attributable to Rwandan and Uganda occupation can be estimated at between 3 million and 3.5 million”.(57)

And, whatever he may or may not have achieved in Uganda with regard to HIV/AIDs, his policies have seen an explosion of HIV/AIDS in the Congo as a result of the war and suffering he unleashed in that country. The United Nations, for example, has noted that the Ugandan involvement in the Congo has resulted in “the spread of HIV/AIDS, the large numbers of child soldiers and the rape of women”.(58)

The Museveni Regime: Undemocratic and Repressive

Museveni’s National Resistance Army seized power by military force in 1986. Museveni ruled without any concession to the democratic process until “no-party” elections were held in 1996, elections in which parties and party electoral organisation were banned, and in which his National Resistance Movement was unhindered.

The London newspaper, ‘The Observer’ has previously noted some of the democratic short-comings of the Museveni regime: “The Americans are leading the charge to warn that he is heading towards the kind of one- party dictatorship the continent knows only too well. At the heart of the issue is Museveni’s ban on multiparty politics.” Museveni was reported to have told Western diplomats that he wishes to maintain a “no-party state” for at least fifteen years. As the American ambassador, Michael Southwick, stated shortly before the no-party election: “If you keep it locked up in a bottle you risk an explosion, because it will take increasing repression to control”.(59) Several years later, a high- level Western diplomat in Uganda noted that “Museveni has become more autocratic with time”.(60) While the Clinton Administration turned a blind eye to Museveni’s repression – because of his attempts to destabilise Sudan – the Bush Administration is now questioning human rights abuses in Uganda.(61)

The African current affairs magazine, ‘New African’, gave a feel for the 1996 Ugandan election: “The view from Kampala is that (Museveni) cannot be beaten because he has set the rules and decided the game he will play. He has manipulated the election process is such a way that it would be almost impossible for him to lose … The Minister of State Security, Col. Kahinda Otafire let fall the extraordinary declaration that if anyone except Museveni won the presidential elections, he would be overthrown within 24-hours.”(62)

The Ugandan military similarly intimidated opposition politicians during the 2001 Ugandan elections by stating that they would “veto” the election of anyone except Museveni.(63) Museveni stated: “Losing is completely hypothetical. It will not happen.”(64) Human Rights Watch placed on record that the system in Uganda “does not allow free and fair democratic elections” and that “since the start of the campaign in January, the opposition have been threatened by violence, arrests, and intimidation, from soldiers and police.”(65) The ‘Christian Science Monitor’ noted Museveni’s “heavy-handed behavior in the course of the elections – during which he illegally allowed military officers to campaign on his behalf, turned a blind eye to the reported intimidation and harassment carried out against his opposition by the military police as well as by his supporters, and ignored complaints of election rigging”.(66) Amnesty International has noted: “Since the outcome of the 2001 presidential elections, basic internationally recognised freedoms of expression, association and movement have become even more strictly curtailed … Those with dissenting viewpoints are more likely to become targets.”(67)

This sort of behaviour combined with the murderous behaviour of the Ugandan military can only but breed dissidence and unrest.

A Party to Regional Destabilisation and Genocide

Uganda has since 1997 been involved in the systematic destabilisation of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the resultant horrific civil war.(68) This involvement continues to this day.(69) As early as 1992 ‘The Guardian’ reported that: “In the six years since Yoweri Museveni took power, his government has managed to alienate three of its five neighbours. Relations remain good with only Tanzania and Zaire.”(70) Museveni sparked off Africa’s most tragic humanitarian crisis when it subsequently sought to destabilise Zaire. In 1997, the London ‘Times’ reported that “Uganda … backed an uprising by rebels in eastern Zaire who are aiming to drive the Zairean Army from the region and bring down President Mobutu”(71)

In 2001, Human Rights Watch documented this involvement, stating that Museveni had “fuelled political and ethnic strife in eastern Congo with disastrous consequences for the local population.”(72) This had included stirring up ethnic violence, murdering civilians and “laying waste their villages.”(73) Human Rights Watch had also previously noted that Uganda was responsible for the murder of large numbers of civilians in north- east Congo.(74) This was also confirmed by Congolese human rights organisations.(75) In late 2002, Uganda was subsequently again accused of deliberately seeking to “provoke ethnic conflict, as in the past” – actions which the United Nations warned risked genocide in the region.(76) In July 2003, a Human Rights Watch report, ‘”Covered in Blood”: Ethnically Targeted Violence’, stated, for example, that Uganda was involved in the ethnically-motivated murder of several thousand Congolese civilians in the Ituri area of north-eastern Uganda.(77) Uganda continues to arm Congolese gunmen responsible for horrific acts of terrorism – acts every bit as horrific as those attributed to the LRA in northern Uganda. The Museveni regime was also accused of militarily and logistically assisting the UNITA rebel movement in Angola.(78)

Additionally, the UN has repeatedly stated that Uganda was criminally and systematically stealing Congo’s resources.(79) A Human Rights Watch report also noted that Ugandan forces “have blatantly exploited Congolese wealth for their own benefit and that of their superiors at home.”(80)

The hypocrisy of Museveni’s public bleating about neighbouring states allegedly destabilising his government is clear.

The International Community’s Responsibility for Continuing Conflict in Uganda.

The international community itself shares a partial responsibility for the continuing war in northern Uganda. This responsibility is at least two-fold. Western governments continue to project Uganda as a success story when the reality is that it is wracked by political turmoil and Uganda’s economy is artificially buoyed by aid. A Refugees International report has observed, for example, that according to one estimate donors provide about 53 percent of Uganda’s budget. They also cited a UN official as saying: “[D]onors don’t want to portray Uganda as another African country that is going down the drain. Because they give so much to Uganda, donors have a political motivation to make sure that it is seen as a success story.”(81) This pretence ignores, in addition to the conflict in northern Uganda, Museveni’s responsibility for the deaths of millions of civilians in Congo. The international community, by facilitating a military rather than a peaceful solution, also bears a direct responsibility for prolonging conflict. A UN news report, for example, has noted: “Some aid agencies working in the north have criticised the international community for allowing Museveni’s government to keep the humanitarian crisis in the north on the back burner … For example, they have expressed concern over the government’s recent decision to re-allocate 23 percent of funds from other ministries to defence, seen by some as indicating a preference for a military solution over a peaceful settlement in the north.”(82)

Cecilia Ogwal, the secretary-general of the opposition Uganda People Congress, has perhaps summed up how many Ugandans feel in her criticism of the international community for “honouring, praising and financing the gunman who disturbed the peace and plunged Uganda into a devastating war”.(83)

Conclusion

Museveni’s claims about continued Sudanese assistance to the LRA ring hollow. They attempt to mask the Ugandan government’s military incompetence and political intolerance. Sudan has absolutely nothing to gain by such a course of action, and – given its impressive diplomatic gains internationally and regionally – a lot to lose. It may be that Museveni wishes to damage the Sudanese peace process. It may be that he simply wishes the war in northern Uganda to go on and on. It may be that he wishes to continue to justify his army’s presence in southern Sudan to provide them with more time to strip the area of its natural resources – just as it has done in eastern Congo. It is also clear that once again Museveni cannot be taken at his word. Despite Sudan having cut all links with the LRA, the SPLA continues to operate out of Uganda. Indeed, the SPLA leader is still able to come and go as an honoured guest within Uganda.(84) The international community must drastically rethink its approach to the Museveni regime, associated as it so clearly is with repression, genocide and regional destabilisation. A good starting point would be to discount Museveni’s facile and self-serving propaganda claims of continuing Sudanese involvement with Ugandan rebels.

Notes:

1. “Uganda: Special Report on the Northern Crisis”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 6 May 2003. Controversy surrounds these policies. Ugandan religious leaders, for example, have described the poor conditions into which these civilians have been forced. Msgr. Mathew Odong, the head of the Lacor Catholic Seminary in Gulu, has stated: “It is true that nearly half of the population of people in northern Uganda live in the refugee camps, which are similar to the concentration camps that used to exist in Germany.” See, “Uganda and Sudan Join Hands to Fight LRA”, ‘Africanews’ (Nairobi), Koinonia Media Centre, May 2002.

2.  Sudan has, for example, over the past several years emerged as a leader of the region and internationally. These developments culminated in Sudan’s presidency of the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) body, as well as the Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, as well as the chairmanship of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. Sudan’s relationship with the European Union has also improved dramatically: “EU, Sudan to Normalise Ties, Resume Development After Peace Accord”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 11 December 2002; “EU Seeks to Renew Dialogue with Sudan Broken Off in 1996”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 10 November 1999 and “EU to Resume Financial Aid to Sudan After Decades-Long Break”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 30 January 2002. In July 2000, the countries of Africa also selected Sudan to represent the continent as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. The fifty- three African nations of the Organisation of African Unity chose Sudan over Mauritius and Uganda to succeed Namibia as the African representative on the Security Council. Although ultimately unsuccessful as the result of intense American lobbying, the Egyptian Foreign Minister said that “there is an African and an Arab decision in Sudan’s favour concerning this issue.” Relations with the United States have also improved. See, for example, “US Allows UN Council to End Sanctions Against Sudan”, News Article by Reuters, 28 September 2001; “US Ready to End U.N. Sanctions on Sudan Friday”, News Article by Reuters, 28 September 2001.

3.  See, for example, “Sudan: Uganda Accused of ‘Masterminding’ Offensive”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 7 July 1999.

4.  ‘Africa Confidential’ (London) 4 October 1996.

5.  See “Uganda/Sudan: Joint Statement”, signed in Kampala on 13 March 2002, between the Government of Sudan and the Ugandan Foreign Minister. See, also, for example, “Sudan Lets Uganda Go After Rebels”, News Article by BBC, 15 March 2002; “Ugandan Army Pursues Rebels into Sudan”, News Article by BBC, 4 March 2002; “Ugandan Troops Redeployed Inside Sudan”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 11 March 2002; “Uganda to Launch Offensive into Sudan to Capture LRA Leader”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 17 March 2002; “Sudanese Govt. Orders Civilians to Vacate Areas Occupied by Ugandan Rebels”, News Article by Xinhua News Agency, 9 May 2002.

6.  “Uganda Constructs Security Roads Inside Sudan”, News Article by Xinhua News Agency, 12 May 2002

7.  “Uganda to Launch Offensive into Sudan to Capture LRA Leader”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 17 March 2002.

8.  “Sudan Extends Month for Ugandan Army’s Operation in Sudan”, News Article by Xinhua News Agency, 24 April 2002.

9.  “Sudan Grants Ugandan Army Extension of Stay”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 11 July 2002.

10.  “Khartoum Extends Uganda’s Right to Pursue Rebels in Sudan”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 21 November 2002.

11.  “Sudan Allows Uganda Troops to Pursue Rebels”, News Article by Reuters, 24 February 2003.

12.  See, for example, “Ugandan Rebels Attack Sudanese Govt. Troops”, News Agency by Xinhua News Agency, 21 March 2002; “Ugandan Rebels Attack Sudan”, News Article by BBC, 22 March 2002, “Ugandan Rebels Raid Sudanese Villages”, News Article by BBC, 8 April 2002.

13.  “Uganda Claims Success in Sudan Raid”, News Article by BBC, 29 March 2002.

14.  “Uganda: Army Says Calm Returning to North”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 5 July 2002.

15.  “Uganda: Army Says Calm Returning to North.” UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 5 July 2002. See also, “Army Says Calm Returning to North”, News Article by AllAfrica.com, 5 July 2002

16.  “Kony’s northern rebels expose the ruling army’s faults but Operation Iron Fist fails to defeat them”, ‘Africa Confidential’ (London), Vol 43 Number 16, 9 August 2002.

17.  See, for example, “Ugandan Army ‘Corners Rebels'”, News Article by BBC, 14 April 2002, and “Defense Minister Amama Mbabazi: ‘We Have Cornered Kony'”, News Article by AllAfrica.com on 24 July 2002.

18. “Uganda and Sudan Join Hands to Fight LRA”, ‘Africanews’ (Nairobi), Koinonia Media Centre, May 2002.

19. “Uganda’s 16-year Civil War Costs Over 1.3 Billion Dollars”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 6 November 2002.

20. “The War isn’t Working”, ‘Africa Confidential’ (London), Vol 43, Number 16, 9 August 2002.

21. “Soldiers of Tomorrow”, ‘Africa Confidential’ (London), Vol 43, Number 16, 9 August 2002.

22. “Sudan-Uganda: Khartoum Denies Backing Ugandan Rebels”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 19 June 2003.

23. See, for example, “Sudan to Assist in Fight Against Uganda Rebels”, News Article by Reuters, 10 January 2003. “Ugandan Troops Redeployed Inside Sudan”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 11 March 2002; “Uganda to Launch Offensive into Sudan to Capture LRA Leader”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 17 March 2002.

24. “Uganda: Army denies ‘fleeing’ from rebels.” UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 9 July 2002.

25. ‘New African’, November 1996.

26. See, for example, “House Raps Government on Northern War”, ‘New Vision’ (Kampala), 5 July 2003, “MP Eresu Cautions MPs on Kony”, ‘New Vision’ (Kampala), 9 July 2003.

27. “Parliament Wants South African Mercenaries to ‘Eliminate’ Rebels”, News Article by allAfrica.com, 8 July 2003.

28. “Who’s Behind the Civil War?”, ‘The East African’ (Nairobi), 23 June 2003.

29. “Sudan-Uganda: African Rights Questions ‘Operation Iron Fist'”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 17 May 2002.

30. “Museveni Says Gov’t Needs to Spend More on Defence”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 31 March 2003.

31. “Kampala Beefs Army to 52,000 Strong”, News Article by Allafrica.com, 30 March 2002.

32. “Sh4b Won’t End North War, Says Reform Agenda”, ‘New Vision’ (Kampala), 1 July 2003.

33. “Why Army Has Failed to Uproot Kony Rebellion”, ‘New Vision’ (Kampala), 2 July 2003.

34.  “Gen. Saleh’s Shs 4bn Magic Wand Won’t Bring Peace”, ‘The Monitor’ (Kampala), 29 June 2003.

35.  “Who’s Behind the Civil War?”, ‘The East African’ (Nairobi), 23 June 2003.

36.  ‘The East African’ (Nairobi), 23 June 2003

37.  “Uganda: Army Denies Blocking Peace Negotiations”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 10 March 2002.

38 “Uganda: Special report on the northern crisis”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 6 May 2003.

39.  “Uganda: Little Acholi Gain from anti-LRA Campaign”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 6 June 2002.

40. Michelle Brown and Sayre Nyce, Uganda’s Forgotten Conflict, Refugees International, 1 November 2002.

41.  “Uganda: Civil Society Sets Terms for Peace in the North”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 19 May 2003.

42.  “Sudan-Uganda: African Rights Questions ‘Operation Iron Fist'”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 17 May 2002.

43.  See, for example, “Kony Calls for Peace Talks”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 30 December 2002.

44.  “Museveni Dismisses LRA Ceasefire Announcement”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 6 March 2003. For LRA ceasefire offers see, for example, “Ugandan Rebels Offer to Talk Peace, With International Involvement”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 4 February 2003, and “Uganda: Kony Declares Unilateral Ceasefire”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 3 March 2003.

45.  David Westbrook, “The Torment of Northern Uganda: A Legacy of Missed Opportunities”, ‘The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution’, Issue 3.2 , June 2000.

46.  Yoweri Museveni, ‘Sowing the Mustard Seed’, Macmillan, London, 1997, p. 178.

47.  ‘The Economist’ (London), 22 July 1995.

48.  ‘The Financial Times’ (London), 25 April 1996.

49.  ‘New African’, November 1995

50.  See, for example, “Uganda: IRIN Special Report on the ADF Rebellion”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 8 December 1999.

51.  See, for example, DRC-Uganda: UPDF Claims ‘Foreign Force’ Backed UPC in Bunia”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 11 March 2003.

52.  “Rights Group Urges Engagement with Western Areas”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 24 December 2001.

53.  “Rights Group Urges Engagement with Western Areas”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 24 December 2001.

54.  “Army ‘Armed to the Teeth’ to Disarm Warriors”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 23 February 2001.

55.  “Uganda”, Armed Conflicts Report 2002, Project Ploughshares, Toronto, 2002.

56.  “Uganda: Rwanda Denies Involvement with LRA”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 28 August 2002.

57.  Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Explotation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1146, United Nations, New York, 16 October 2002.

58.  Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Explotation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1146, United Nations, New York, 16 October 2002

59.  ‘The Observer’ (London), 12 May 1996.

60.  “Where Despots Once Reigned, a Lazy Afternoon”, ‘The Christian Science Monitor’ (Boston), 14 March 2001.

61.  “America Questions Museveni on Rights”, ‘The Monitor’ (Kampala), 28 June 2003.

62.  ‘New African’, April 1996.

63.  “Soldiers of Tomorrow”, ‘Africa Confidential’ (London), Vol 43 Number 16, 9 August 2002.

64.  “Ungracious Winner”, ‘Africa Confidential’ (London), Vol 42 Number 7, 6 April 2001.

65.  “Violence ‘Marring’ Ugandan Election'”, News Article by Afrol.com, 6 March 2001. See also Human Rights Watch report, ‘Uganda: Not a Level Playing Field’, 2001.

66.  “Where despots once reigned, a lazy afternoon”, ‘The Christian Science Monitor’, 14 March 2001.

67.  Amnesty International, 14 September 2001.

68.  See, for example, “Conflict in Congo Has Killed 4.7m, Charity Says”, ‘The Guardian’ (London), 8 April 2003, “DR Congo: Africa’s Worst War”, News Article by BBC, 8 April 2003 and

69.  See, for example, “Uganda ‘Arming’ Congolese Militia”, ‘The Monitor’ (Kampala), 8 July 2003, and “Germany Warns Uganda, Rwanda Over Congo Rebels”, ‘The Monitor’ (Kampala), 10 July 2003.

70.  ‘The Guardian’ (London), 23 April 1992.

71.  ‘The Times’ (London), 17 January 1997

72.  See, Uganda in Eastern DR: Fuelling Political and Ethnic Strife, Human Rights Watch, New York, March 2001.

73.  “DRC: Ugandan Presence Has Fuelled Strife in Congo”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 27 March 2001.

74.  See, “Uganda Blamed for Massacres in North-East Congo Kinshasa”, News Article by Afrol.com, 22 January 2001, and “Clashes in North- Eastern Congo Uproot Thousands”, News Article by Afrol.com, 24 January 2001.

75.  “Claims of Ugandan Involvement in Ethnic Conflict”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 16 February 2000.

76.  “Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda Still Looting the Congo”, News Article by Afrol.com, 22 October 2002.

77. “Report Pins Uganda on Ituri Saga”, ‘New Vision’ (Kampala), 9 July 2003.

78.  See, for example, “Uganda: HRW Report Suggests Link Between Kampala and UNITA”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 17 December 1999.

79.  See Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Explotation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1146, United Nations, New York, 16 October 2002. See also “U.N. Details Congo ‘Mass Looting'”, News Article by CNN, 16 April 2001, “Congolese Civilians Victims of Foreign Troops’ Exploitation”, News Article by afrol.com, 21 April 2001, “Exploitation of Congolese Resources Continues ‘Unabated'”, News Article by Afrol.com, 20 November 2001, “Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda Still Looting the Congo”, News Article by Afrol.com, 22 October 2002.

80.  “DRC: Ugandan Presence Has Fuelled Strife in Congo”, IRIN, 27 March 2001.

81.  Michelle Brown and Sayre Nyce, Uganda’s Forgotten Conflict, Refugees International, 1 November 2002

82. “Uganda: Special report on the northern crisis”, UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 6 May 2003.

83. ‘New African’, April 1996.

84. See, for example, “Sudanese Rebel Leader Arrives in Uganda”, News Article by Xinhua News Agency, 10 July 2003.

The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council sent this media contribution to Media Monitors Network (MMN)

LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here

Comment moderation is enabled. Your comment may take some time to appear.