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The Clinton Administration and Sudan:
A Systemic Intelligence Failure
by ESPAC
Highlighted by the August 1998 al-Shifa fiasco, which saw the
unjustified destruction by American cruise missiles of a medicines factory
in Khartoum, the Clinton Administration's intelligence and information on
Sudan in general and "terrorism" in particular, and the way the
administration has chosen to interpret and use intelligence, has
self-evidently been abysmal. The Clinton Administration is served by
thirteen separate intelligence agencies. Their budget amounts to almost
thirty billion dollars a year: 85 percent of this budget is dedicated to
military intelligence. The primary mission of these intelligence agencies
is "to collect, evaluate, and disseminate foreign intelligence to
assist the President and senior US Government policymakers in making
decisions relating to the national security".(1) Amongst the many
resources at the disposal of these intelligence agencies are satellites
that are said to be able to read newspaper headlines at street level and
that can monitor every electronic communication on the face of the earth.
One would have assumed that allegations of weapons of mass destruction
technology, and factories allegedly engaged in the production of such
weapons, particularly in the hands of people apparently of people such as
Osama bin Laden, would have been of considerable significance to American
"national security". One would have imagined that some of the
immense resources briefly mentioned above would have been focused on every
facet of the al-Shifa factory in Khartoum. Indeed, the Clinton
Administration claimed that the al-Shifa medicines factory had been under
surveillance for several months before the Cruise missile attack which
destroyed the plant. (2)
.
It would appear, however, that despite having supposedly monitored the
al-Shifa factory for all that time and despite the awesome array of
intelligence resources and assets at their disposal, it was beyond the
ability of the American intelligence community to ascertain who owned
Sudan's biggest pharmaceutical factory - even though the factory was
publicly mortgaged. It is also clear that far from being able to ascertain
whether the al-Shifa medicines factory produced any chemical weapons, the
American intelligence community were not even able to find out whether al-Shifa
produced any commercial products - despite the fact that the factory
produced two-thirds of Sudan's medicines and animal drug needs, and held
United Nations drug contracts. A simple low-tech telephone call to the
Sudanese chamber of commerce, or to the factory itself, or to any of the
various ambassadors - including the British ambassador - who had visited
the factory, would have answered several of the questions which the
Clinton Administration so publicly got wrong in the days following the
bombing. This almost unbelievable intelligence failure is also all the
more surprising given the fact that Washington had previously enjoyed a
warm military and intelligence relationship with Sudan in the 1980s, and
despite the fact that unlike intelligence gathering in other countries
such as Libya, Iraq or Iran, which is very difficult given the closed
nature of those countries, Sudan is, in the words of the London
'Guardian':
"one of the most open and relaxed Arab countries". (3)
That the Clinton Administration chose to act on what has subsequently
been seen to be faulty intelligence is a reflection of poor judgment on
the part of the Administration. Equally unacceptable has been the
Administration's tendency to ignore intelligence concerns when they
conflicted with stated policy. To have allowed intelligence gathering and
analysis on Sudan to degenerate as much has it clearly did is a reflection
of bad government. Both are compounded by the Administration's clear
attempts to then defend questionable stances towards Sudan by hiding
behind "intelligence" which could not be "revealed."
Former President Carter established in 1993 that, despite listing Sudan
as a state sponsor of terrorism, the Clinton Administration had no
evidence, and no intelligence, to support the listing. Several years later
the absence of any data to support the Clinton Administration's continuing
allegations of Sudanese involvement in terrorism continued to be reported.
In a 26 December 1996 'International Herald Tribune' article by veteran
American investigative reporter Tim Weiner, it was clear that no evidence
or proof had emerged: "U.S. officials have no hard proof that Sudan
still provides training centers for terrorists". The article stated
that "The big issue for the United States is that Sudan has served as
a safe house for stateless revolutionaries". Mr. Weiner also
interviewed key American officials "responsible for analyzing the
Sudan". The answer to whether or not Sudan was involved in supporting
terrorism, was "we just don't know". Sudan, nevertheless,
continued to be listed as a state sponsor of terrorism. (4)
What is clear is that American intelligence agencies have not able to
find any proof of Sudanese involvement in international terrorism, before
or after the Clinton Administration listed Sudan as a state sponsor of
terrorism. The singular lack of judgment on the part of the Clinton
Administration and the American intelligence community was amply
illustrated by its eagerness to accepted fabricated claims concerning the
Sudanese government.
The Clinton Administration's Withdrawal of Over 100 "Fabricated"
Reports on Sudan and "Terrorism"
Not only were American intelligence agencies unable to accurately analyze
events and trends in Sudan, there is ample evidence that they actually
accepted as facts claims about Sudanese involvement in terrorism which
were subsequently revealed to have been fabricated. In September 1998, in
the wake of the al-Shifa fiasco, both the 'New York Times' and the London
'Times' reported that the Central Intelligence Agency had previously
secretly had to withdraw over one hundred of its reports alleging Sudanese
involvement in terrorism. The CIA had realized that the reports in
question had been fabricated. The London 'Times' concluded that this:
"is no great surprise to those who have watched similar CIA
operations in Africa where American intelligence 'is often seen as an
oxymoron.' " (5)
A striking example of this was the closure by the Clinton Administration
of the American embassy in Khartoum in 1996. This decision was presented
as yet one more example of concern over Sudan's alleged support for
international terrorism. CIA reports were said to have stated that
American embassy staff and their families were in danger.(6) The Clinton
Administration's spokesman, Nicholas Burns, stated at the time that:
"We have been concerned for a long period of time about the
activities and movements of specific terrorist organizations who are
resident in Sudan. Over the course of many, many conversations with the
Sudanese Government, we simply could not be assured that the Sudanese
Government was capable of protecting our Americans against the specific
threats that concerned us...The specific nature of these threats, the
persistence of these threats, and our root belief at the end of all these
conversations that this particular government could not protect them led
us to take this extraordinary measure of withdrawing all of our
diplomats." (7)
It is now admitted the reports cited in justifying this decision were
subsequently withdrawn as having been fabricated. As the 'New York Times'
investigation documented:
"In late 1995 the CIA realized that a foreign agent who had warned
repeatedly of startling terrorist threats to U.S. diplomats, spies and
their children in Khartoum was fabricating information. They withdrew his
reports, but the climate of fear and mistrust created by the reports
bolstered the case for withdrawing personnel from the U.S. Embassy in
Khartoum, officials said...The embassy remained closed, even though, as a
senior intelligence official put it, 'the threat wasn't there' as of
1996.".(8)
The 'New York Times' also reported that there were similar unverified
and uncorroborated reports that the then national security advisor, Antony
Lake, had been targeted for assassination by terrorists based in Sudan.
Lake was moved into Blair House, a federal mansion across the street from
the White House and then to a second, secret, location. The 'New York
Times' reported that Lake "disappeared from view around the time the
embassy's personnel were withdrawn". There is little doubt that the
supposed threat to Lake was as fictional as the CIA reports concerning the
American embassy in Khartoum. The newspaper stated that: "The threat
to Tony Lake had a chilling effect on the National Security Council."
There is no doubt that the similarly spurious "threats" to
American diplomats and their children in Khartoum had an equally chilling
effect on the State Department and other agencies. The fact remains
however that these "threats", then seen as proof of Sudanese
complicity in terrorism, were contained in the over one hundred reports
that the CIA later admitted it had to withdraw because they had been
fabricated. To have to withdraw one or two intelligence reports on such
serious matters is bad enough. To have to withdraw over one hundred such
reports can only be described as a massive systemic intelligence failure.
One can only but point out that the Clinton Administration used the
Sudanese government's inability to react to "specific" threats
made by "specific" terrorist organizations against American
diplomats, non-existent fabricated threats, as one more example of Sudan's
involvement with terrorism.
The American embassy in Khartoum was subsequently partly re-opened in
October 1997, and Antony Lake eventually did come out of hiding. And yet,
as late as March 2000, four years after the above intelligence fiasco, the
White House was still falsely stating: "In 1996, we removed full-time
staff from the Embassy and relocated them to Nairobi for security
reasons." (9) In what could pass for a snapshot of the accuracy of
Clinton Administration claims about Sudan and terrorism in general, the
'New York Times' stated that:
"the Central Intelligence Agency...recently concluded that reports
that had appeared to document a clear link between the Sudanese Government
and terrorist activities were fabricated and unreliable...The United
States is entitled to use military force to protect itself against
terrorism. But the case for every such action must be rigorously
established. In the case of the Sudan, Washington has conspicuously failed
to prove its case." (10)
Ambassador Donald Petterson, the United States ambassador to Sudan from
1992-95, clearly documents an earlier example of the Clinton
Administration acting upon fabricated and unreliable claims of Sudanese
complicity in "terrorism". In his memoirs of his time in Sudan
Ambassador Petterson reveals that in August 1993, "information about
a plan to harm American officials led the State Department to order an
evacuation of our spouses and children and a reduction of my American
staff by one-third". Petterson stated that "[w]e at the embassy
had seen or heard nothing manifesting a clear and present danger from
either terrorists or the Sudanese government. But the order was firm and
irrevocable". (11) Petterson also documented that subsequently
"new information" had been "acquired" which indicated
"an increasingly precarious situation for Americans in
Khartoum". Ambassador Petterson later reveals that the allegations in
question were unfounded:
"The months wore on, no credible threat to embassy Americans
materialized, and eventually serious doubt was raised about the validity
of the information that had led to the evacuation." (12)
It perhaps goes without saying that for a government to evacuate the
spouses and children of diplomats, and to reduce its embassy staff, is a
serious matter. It is an even more serious matter when a government
totally closes an embassy, withdrawing all diplomats and dependants. This
was done on two occasions in Sudan. The partial evacuation happened in
1993. The total evacuation was carried out in 1996. The Clinton
Administration ordered both evacuations on the basis of intelligence
information received which supposedly warned of threats to American
diplomats and their families. On both occasions the Administration also
demanded that the Sudanese government somehow deal with these threats, and
it was inferred that if Khartoum did not do so this would be more evidence
of Sudan's involvement with terrorism. It is now clear, as outlined by
independent sources such as Ambassador Petterson, and the 'New York
Times', that both the partial evacuation of American embassy staff and
dependants in 1993, and the full withdrawal of the embassy in 1996, were
the results of faulty intelligence reports based on claims subsequently
revealed to have been fabricated.
The Clinton Administration's Refusal of Sudanese Requests for Counter-Terrorism
Teams to Visit Sudan
The Clinton Administration's poor record and questionable judgment with
regard to intelligence and the issue of terrorism was further highlighted
by the September 1998 'New York Times' revelation that:
"In February 1997, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir sent President
Clinton a personal letter. It offered, among other things, to allow U.S.
intelligence, law-enforcement and counter-terrorism personnel to enter
Sudan and to go anywhere and see anything, to help stamp out terrorism.
The United States never replied to that letter."
In April 1997, there was another invitation, once again inviting the
Clinton Administration to send FBI counter-terrorism units to Sudan to
verify any information they may have had about terrorism. The letter was
addressed to Representative Lee Hamilton, the then chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, and is part of the Congressional Record. (13)
This offer was eventually turned down four months later.
There is a further, even more disturbing example of the Clinton
Administration's questionable judgment regarding Sudan and international
terrorism. In a series of investigative articles entitled "U.S.
Fumbles Chance to Nab Bombers: State Department Stopped FBI from Pursuing
Leads in East Africa Blasts", "State, FBI Questioned Over Africa
Blasts: Congress Questions Sudan Missile Strike, 'Missed
Opportunities'" and "Was Sudan Raid on Target? Did FBI Botch
Chance to Grab Embassy Bombing Suspects?", the American MSNBC new
network reported that in early August 1997, shortly after the terrorist
bombings of the American embassies (and before the bombing of the al-Shifa
factory), the Sudanese authorities had arrested two prime suspects in the
embassy bombings. These suspects had been observed monitoring the American
embassy in Khartoum, and were arrested after attempting to rent an
apartment across the street from the embassy. The two men had Pakistani
passports, Afghani accents, and a list of known bin-Laden contacts in
Sudan. They had also both been in Kenya for the three weeks before the
embassy bombing. The reference on their visa applications to enter Sudan
was the same company accused by the American authorities of supplying
explosives and weapons to Osama bin-Laden.
The Sudanese authorities notified the FBI and repeatedly offered to turn
the two suspects over to the American authorities. Senior American law
enforcement officials have subsequently stated that while the FBI were
eager to taken up the offer, the State Department prevented any such
investigation. After the bombing of the al-Shifa factory, the Sudanese
government deported the two men to Pakistan. (14) In July 1999, MSNBC
further documented that there had been Sudanese offers to assist even
after the al-Shifa bombing:
"Still, despite fierce protests from Sudan over the missile attack,
the Sudanese government has continued to court U.S. officials with
intelligence allegedly collected during the interrogations of the two
before they were deported and observations made during the period between
their release and deportation. As late as last month, FBI officials had
renewed their requests to the State Department to sanction official
contacts with Sudan that might lead to new information about the bin Laden
network's plans. Again, the State Department declined." (15)
The MSNBC report also quoted a Kenyan diplomat, who described his
government as "furious" that the U.S. had passed up on an
opportunity to apprehend men suspected of involvement in the bombing which
killed hundreds of Kenyans.
It is a matter of record that both House and Senate intelligence
committees began an investigation into why the Clinton Administration
passed up on the chance of interviewing two prime suspects in the embassy
bombings. By any standard, the Administration's studied disinterest in the
opportunity of interrogating these two suspects in the bombing of two
American embassies is deeply questionable. Perhaps it was ineptitude on
the part of politicians, intelligence and law enforcement officials.
Perhaps it was an unwillingness on the part of sections of the Clinton
Administration to address any development that might have invalidated the
attack on Sudan and the al-Shifa factory that was to follow a week or so
afterwards, a strike that was necessary and urgent in order for President
Clinton to appear "presidential" in the midst of the Lewinsky
scandal.
The Clinton Administration, Sudan and Osama Bin-Laden
The Clinton Administration's capacity for own goals is clear. The issue
of Osama bin-Laden is a case in point. As was outlined in the 1993
Patterns of Global Terrorism, Pakistan had then begun to "expel Arab
militants affiliated with various mujahedin groups and nongovernmental aid
organizations". (16) It is no secret that many of these individuals,
denied entry to their own countries, took advantage of Sudan's then non-
visa policy for Arab nationals and sought refuge in Sudan. One such person
was the Saudi Osama bin-Laden. Previously a CIA asset and the recipient of
considerable American funding during the Afghan war, Osama bin-Laden chose
not to return to his home country, and also went to Sudan. A man of
considerable wealth, bin Laden became commercially involved in Sudan. One
of his construction companies began building roads.
The Clinton Administration brought pressure to bear on the Khartoum
authorities to expel him from the Sudan. The Sudanese minister of
information, Dr. Ghazi Saleheddin, revealed that:
"We gave [U.S. officials] a piece of advice that they never
followed. We told them: 'Don't send him out of Sudan because you will lose
control over him...Now, the United States has ended up with war with an
invisible enemy' ".(17)
In May 1996, at the insistence of the United States, Sudan expelled bin
Laden and over one hundred of his followers and their dependants. They
chose to leave for Afghanistan, perhaps the single most difficult place in
the world from which to monitor bin Laden and his activities. The results
of this relocation are sadly all too well known. While in Sudan he did not
engage in any terrorist activities. It was comparatively easy for the
Sudanese and American authorities to monitor his activities, and, in the
case of the Sudanese authorities probably to exercise a moderating
influence of sorts.
For all the allegations it has made, and despite the awesome and
unprecedented intelligence, information-gathering and surveillance tools
at its disposal, the Clinton Administration has not been able to point to
a single act of terrorism sponsored or supported by the government of
Sudan. It has admitted as much in its own reports. Neither has the
Administration identified a single "terrorist training camp" in
Sudan: had any such data been available it would undoubtedly been attacked
at the same time as the al-Shifa factory. Senior European diplomatic
sources in Khartoum have questioned whether these camps ever existed.
The hundreds of news and sensation hungry journalists who flooded into
Khartoum following the attack on the al-Shifa factory, all eagerly
exploring any terrorist link, were also unable to find any evidence of
terrorists or terrorist camps. What the Administration did
"identify" as a chemical weapons-producing facility, the al-Shifa
plant, is now internationally acknowledged to have been nothing more than
a medicines factory.
The Clinton Administration is also guilty of turning a blind eye to
crucial intelligence opportunities in the war against terrorism. The
Administration chose not to accept two offers by the Khartoum authorities
for American intelligence and counter-terrorist personnel to carry out
whatever investigations they wished to in Sudan. An even more questionable
Clinton Administration decision was to ignore repeated Sudanese requests
that they interrogate two suspects in the Nairobi embassy bombing who had
been arrested by the Sudanese authorities in Khartoum while renting
accommodation overlooking the American embassy. The Clinton Administration
would appear to have ignored this vital opportunity as it would have been
inconvenient given that they intended to attack Sudan because of its
alleged complicity in the Nairobi bombings.
It is evident that the Clinton Administration has barely, if at all,
acknowledged Sudan's efforts to address American concerns about its
alleged support for terrorism. It is difficult to see what more Khartoum
could have done in this respect. Sudan arrested and extradited Illyich
Ramirez Sanchez, "Carlos the Jackal" to France, and, as
requested by Washington, it expelled Osama bin Laden, and his associates,
from Sudan. In September 1995 Sudan imposed strict visa requirements on
visitors to Sudan, ending its no visa policy for Arab nationals. It has
signed various United Nations, international and Arab anti-terrorist
accords. In April 1998, for example, Sudan became a signatory to the Arab
Agreement for Combating Terrorism. The Sudanese ministers of internal
affairs and justice signed the agreement on behalf of Sudan. (18) In
August, 1998, the Sudanese ambassador to Egypt stated Sudan welcomed an
Egyptian proposal to convene an international conference on combating
terrorism. (19) Sudan has also signed the chemical weapons convention in
May 1999. (20) Sudan has on several occasions invited the American
government to send CIA and FBI counter-terrorists teams down to Sudan to
investigate any concerns they may have about Sudan and terrorism. Not only
did Sudan immediately condemn the embassy bombings, it actually arrested
two prime suspects in the bombings and repeatedly requested that the
American authorities interrogate these suspects.
One can only hope that the new Bush Administration will take note of the
appalling state of affairs with regard to American intelligence analysis
of Sudan. The al-Shifa medicines factory fiasco provides irrefutable proof
of this. The United States people were repeatedly humiliated by inept
intelligence positions and false claims about Sudan made by the Clinton
Administration. The Bush Administration must consider a root and branch
revamping of its intelligence sources and analysis with regards to Sudan
if for no other reason than to avoid the international embarrassments that
so characterized the Clinton, Berger and Albright years.
Notes
2- 'U.S. Intelligence Defends VX-Sudan Link', News Article by Reuters on
25 August 1998 at 14:22:54.
3- 'Western Envoys in Sudan Faced with Divided Loyalties', The Guardian,
London, 27 August 1998.
5- The Times, London, 22 September 1998; The New York Times, 21 and 23
September, 1998.
6- 'Withdrawal of US Diplomats - Security Council Condemnation',
Keesings Archives, Volume 42, 1996.
8- 'Decision to Strike Factory in Sudan Based on Surmise', The New
York Times, 21 September 1999.
9- Extract on Sudan from the Daily Press Briefing, the United
States Department of State, 3 March 2000, 12:35 PM.
10- 'Dubious Decisions on the Sudan', Editorial, The New York Times, 23
September 1998.
11- Donald Petterson, 'Inside Sudan - Political Islam, Conflict
and Catastrophe', Westview Books, Boulder, 1999,' p.71.
12- Ibid., p.91.
13- 'Perspective on Terrorism - Olive Branch Ignored', The Los
Angeles Times, 30 September 1998.
14- "State, FBI Questioned Over Africa Blasts: Congress
Questions Sudan Missile Strike, 'Missed Opportunities'", 19 August
1999; and 'Was Sudan raid on target? Did FBI Botch Chance to Grab Embassy
Bombing Suspects?', MSNBC TV
News, 29 December 1999,
16- Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1993, United States Department
of State, Washington-DC, 1994, p.4.
17- 'Sudan Seeks an Apology from the United States along with
U.N.', News Article by Associated Press on 24 August 1998 at
08:26:28
18- 'Internal Affairs Minister: Arab Agreement For Combating
Terrorism is a Strong Reply to Enemies', Sudan News Agency, 25 April
1998.
19- 'Sudan Welcomes Egypt's Anti-Terrorism Conference Proposal',
News Article by Xinhua on 22 August 1998 at 14:32:43.
20- 'Sudan Says Joins Pact Against Chemical Weapons', News Article
by Reuters on 19 August 1999 at 10:31:52.
The European-Sudanese Public Affairs
Council sent this media contribution to Media Monitors
Network (MMN)
Source:
by courtesy & © 2001 European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council
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